Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt · Blízký východ
Raz Zimmt patří mezi osobnosti, které Storyz World sleduje kvůli tématům výzkumu a odborných témat v kapitole Blízký východ. Země, k níž se sledování vztahuje: Írán.
And let us assume that it does indeed happen, and that, despite the frustration and despair felt by broad segments of the Iranian public traumatized after a year of two wars and the brutal suppression of protests, hundreds of thousands of Iranians once again take to the streets. Would that guarantee the collapse of the Iranian regime? Would it ensure that the regime agrees to surrender to U.S. demands? Would those hundreds of thousands be able to form an organized and effective protest movement capable of posing a significant threat to the regime’s stability? Would we see, this time, cracks and defections within the security forces and the IRGC sufficient to produce a different outcome from the one we witnessed in early January 2026? One can always hope, but wishful thinking is not a sound basis for strategy.
a. Israel has been operating in Ali al-Taher for several weeks. At this stage, there is no indication that Iran intends to respond to this activity. b. Iran has demonstrated over the past week a willingness to escalate its attacks in response to U.S. strikes in southern Iran. At the same time, even the Iranian response to this week’s unusual U.S. strike did not go beyond what Iran had done on previous occasions. This may indicate that, at this stage, Iran is not interested in further escalation, certainly not vis-à-vis Israel, since such escalation would not serve Tehran’s interests, particularly at the present time. c. There is no indication of the presence of “dozens of IRGC members,” let alone two senior Iranian officers, in Ali al-Taher. Israel, which in fact has an interest in demonstrating Iranian involvement in Hezbollah’s fighting, has denied that Iranian fighters are present there. d. There has been no unusual statement by senior Iranian officials indicating an intention to respond to Israeli activity in Ali al-Taher. Mohsen Rezaei, who was interviewed this week by Al-Manar, stressed that, from Iran’s perspective, Beirut and the Dahiyeh are red lines. He said nothing about Israeli activity in Ali al-Taher. Bottom line: It is clear that someone has an interest in constraining continued Israeli activity that threatens Hezbollah’s continued presence in Ali al-Taher and perhaps even in trying to pressure Iran to step up pressure over Israeli activity on the ridge. But I would treat the credibility of this report with considerable skepticism.
Iran’s economy is deteriorating fast. Will it force Tehran to compromise? | The Jerusalem Post https://t.co/m2JDTGIL0i
"Washington could fall into the same trap Tehran did after closing the Strait of Hormuz: overestimating a temporary achievement, excessive confidence, and assuming that time is necessarily on its side."
The resumption of direct military confrontation between the US and Iran provides further evidence that Tehran does not intend to easily relinquish the leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. My recent piece for @ynetnews https://t.co/4DmIditc12
האתגרים בדרך לתוכנית השאפתנית של הממשלה העיראקית לפירוק המיליציות הנאמנות לטהראן. מאמר חדש של ירון שניידר ב-@INSS_Hebrew https://t.co/Sxtdqv4aLS
לאיראן יש עדיין יכולת להסלים חרף מאמצי ארה"ב לפגוע ביכולותיה. וושינגטון עלולה ליפול לאותה מלכודת שבה נפלה טהראן לאחר סגירת הורמוז: הערכת יתר של הישג זמני והנחה שהזמן פועל בהכרח לטובתה. פרשנות שלי ב-@ynetalerts https://t.co/lA5RxHTNlX
Israeli Science and Technology Minister Gila Gamliel, who has developed a close diplomatic and public relationship with Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last shah, fell from 25th to 35th place on the Likud Knesset slate following a revised count of the primary votes.
Former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, responding in an interview with IBNA to a question about whether national interests should be secured through war or negotiations: "We should look at how the Prophet made decisions regarding peace and war. I believe that the Prophet reached the conquest of Mecca through the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. Look at the approach he took when he was weak, how he acted in times of peace, and how he behaved when he was powerful. When the Prophet saw that confrontation was not possible, he accepted the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. In other words, when you are weak, save yourself and those around you. Then go and build yourself up, become stronger, and return to conquer Mecca."
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian's son and political adviser, Yousef Pezeshkian: "I am not opposed to uranium enrichment and will accept whatever decision the Supreme National Security Council and the Supreme Leader make. My only point is that we need to understand the full implications of our decision and make it with full awareness. Our survival does not depend on uranium enrichment. If we do not enrich uranium, we will not die. Our nuclear energy program does not depend on uranium enrichment. Even today, the fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant is not produced domestically; it is imported from Russia. We have more important technologies without which our security and governance will suffer, yet we have no plans for them. Nor do we show the same degree of national sensitivity and determination toward them that we show when it comes to uranium enrichment."
Iran's President Pezeshkian, addressing IRIB chief Peyman Jebelli during a cabinet meeting: "When I turn on the television, I really have no desire to watch. If I, someone who wants to devote my life to the Islamic Republic, have come to feel this way, imagine how the public feels. I don't want to sound bitter, but I simply don't watch anymore. When I do, it gets on my nerves. More than ever, we need unity, cohesion, and a unified voice."
Told @itay_il that the idea that a prolonged economic crisis generates public irritation and dissatisfaction is obviously correct. But an angry citizen doesn't necessarily go out into the street. From there to bringing down a regime, the path is far from straightforward. https://t.co/N0je0XaEm5
Iranian business activity has deep, mutually lucrative roots in Dubai and continues to thrive despite the American warnings https://t.co/aoWY8J3CI6 דרך @WSJ
Two Takeaways Instead of a Six-Month War Summary First, the Iran-U.S. confrontation is not a zero-sum game. The fact that the United States and Israel have so far failed to achieve their strategic objectives in the war, namely regime change, dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, and neutralizing its missile capabilities, did not make Iran the winner. Despite its achievements, foremost among them the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its demonstration of an ability to inflict severe damage on its neighbors and the global economy, Iran emerged from the phase of high-intensity fighting with significant economic damage, badly damaged industries, a new leader struggling to consolidate his rule, and growing challenges to its ability to employ its proxies in the face of mounting pressure on them, for example in Lebanon and Iraq. By the same token, the fact that Iran now appears to be losing momentum, that the United States is succeeding in partially reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and that the naval blockade is exacting an increasingly heavy toll on Iran does not mean that the United States is winning. Even if U.S. military achievements ultimately make it possible to restore the status quo that prevailed in the Strait of Hormuz before the war, and even that remains far from certain, this does not change the fact that the war’s original strategic objectives have not been achieved, at least so far. Second, even if the phase of high-intensity warfare appears to be behind us, and that is by no means certain, it is still too early to sum up the war. Iran retains the ability to escalate the crisis in ways that could impose heavy costs on the United States, its neighbors, and the global economy. It is not clear why Iran is currently refraining from further escalation, whether this reflects operational constraints, a preference to give diplomacy another chance, or an assessment in Tehran that time is still on its side. Either way, Iran’s calculus could change quickly, and with it, the dynamics of the confrontation. Two conclusions follow. The first is that all of us need a considerable degree of analytical humility. Developments over the past several months demonstrate just how quickly the balance of achievements and setbacks on both sides can shift. We should therefore be prepared to reassess our previous judgments and avoid, as much as possible, simplistic, binary portrayals of “winners” and “losers.” The second is the need to guard against triumphalism and against overestimating the significance of temporary gains. Until recently, the Iranian leadership appeared to have fallen in love with its own victory narrative and with the belief that time was on its side. Now that the trend appears less favorable from Tehran’s perspective, Washington should be careful not to fall into the same trap. Recent U.S. achievements do not guarantee that Iran will capitulate to American demands, much less that the regime will collapse. In a conflict that has yet to be decided, what at one point appears to be a dramatic shift in the balance of power in favor of one side may ultimately prove to have been only a temporary advantage.
הופכת לצפון קוריאה? הביטחוניזציה הגוברת באיראן. פרשנות קצרה שלי ב-@INSS_Hebrew https://t.co/2FFRiUFi0N
Pakistan's interior minister meets with US envoy after talks in Tehran https://t.co/b8xCp8b3b4
Iranian Majlis Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf’s adviser, Mohammad Saeed Ahadian: “The new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (Mohsen Rezaei) is also seeking the fulfillment of the same conditions outlined in the MOU, which the Supreme Leader emphasized in his message endorsing the agreement, what some have referred to as the ‘in-principle message.’”
During a meeting of the Iranian Parliament’s Energy Committee to discuss the country’s ongoing power outages, attended by the deputy energy minister and senior electricity-sector officials, the power went out at the meeting venue itself.
זה מתייחס לריאיון האחרון של מוחסן רזאא'י, מזכיר המועצה העליונה לביטחון לאומי, שבו טען שהתקיפה האמריקאית על איראן חיזקה את המוטיבציה של מדינות העולם (לאו דווקא איראן באופן ספציפי) לפתח נשק גרעיני, לאחר שהוכח שגם מנגנוני פיקוח בינלאומיים וחברות ב-NPT אינם מספקים הגנה מתקיפה צבאית. זה לא בדיוק "איום בפצצה" אבל בהחלט אינדיקציה נוספת לשיח המתנהל בטהראן סביב לקחי המלחמה בהקשר לתקפותה של דוקטרינת הגרעין. הרחבתי על כך כאן: https://t.co/swrbPTkwQ4
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