Danny Citrinowicz
@citrinowicz · Middle East
Danny Citrinowicz is followed by Storyz World for research and subject expertise coverage connected to Israel in the Middle East chapter.
A war that did not bring down the Iranian regime. A war that did not resolve the Iranian nuclear challenge, as the continuing uncertainty surrounding activities at Pickaxe mountain makes painfully clear. A war that did not eliminate Iran’s ability to rebuild its ballistic missile arsenal. A war that did not sever Tehran’s ties to the Houthis, the Shiite militias in Iraq, or Hezbollah. But there is one achievement we are apparently supposed to celebrate: roughly 30 percent of oil traffic is now moving through the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway that was fully open before the war began. This is not strategic success. It is a colossal strategic failure whose tactical and operational achievements are increasingly overshadowed by what the war failed to accomplish. The question Washington and Jerusalem should now be asking is much more fundamental: Are there actually kinetic solutions to any of these core strategic challenges? Because if the Islamic Republic survives, with its nuclear problem unresolved, its missile-production capacity intact, its regional networks still functioning, and Hormuz less secure than before, then our strategic position after the war may be worse than it was when the war began. And that is before accounting for perhaps the most consequential outcome of all: the doctrinal transformation inside Iran itself. The Iran emerging from this war appears more willing to take risks, more inclined toward direct action, less hesitant, and potentially less predictable. Operational achievements matter. But wars must ultimately be judged by the strategic reality they leave behind. By that standard, it is becoming increasingly difficult to call this campaign a success. Will Iran’s regime eventually collapse under the weight of economic pressure? Maybe. No one really knows. But that is precisely the point. You cannot build a strategy around an outcome you cannot reliably predict. The regime could fall next month, in five years, or survive for decades. Economic pressure may weaken it significantly without producing political collapse, and it may simultaneously encourage Tehran to escalate abroad in an effort to impose costs on its adversaries. Regime collapse is therefore a possibility, not a strategy. A serious Iran policy must be built around what Washington can actually influence and plan for, not around the hope that economic pain will eventually produce a political outcome whose timing, mechanism, and consequences remain fundamentally unpredictable. #IranWar
I’m sorry to say it, but based on the Saudi Air Force’s performance during its previous campaign in #Yemen, I would be very cautious about assuming that airpower alone can stop the current Houthi advance. Saudi Arabia possesses some of the most sophisticated aircraft and weapons systems in the region. But advanced platforms do not automatically translate into battlefield effectiveness. What ultimately matters is the integration of intelligence and strike capabilities, pilot training and operational experience, target acquisition, battle-damage assessment, and, critically, coordination between air and ground forces. Dropping precision-guided munitions is not a strategy. The challenge is even greater today because the Houthis are not the same force Saudi Arabia confronted a decade ago. They have accumulated significant combat experience and developed increasingly sophisticated air-defense capabilities, making sustained air operations more difficult and potentially more costly. I hope I’m wrong. But if past performance is any indication, I would not build a strategy for stopping the Houthis around the assumption that Saudi airpower will be decisive. The uncomfortable truth is that Saudi Arabia cannot confront the Houthis alone. The events of last night only reinforce that reality. This is no longer simply a Saudi-Houthi confrontation. The Houthis have developed capabilities that pose a broader threat to regional security, maritime trade, and freedom of navigation. If the objective is to contain that threat effectively, Riyadh will need more than its own military capabilities. It will require a broad and credible international coalition willing to share the operational, intelligence, and political burden. That is the painful lesson: Saudi Arabia cannot carry this fight by itself, and pretending otherwise will only give the Houthis more room to expand their leverage. And again, I sincerely hope I am underestimating Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities. But I cannot shake the conclusion that when it comes to the Houthis, the Saudis need help, and they need it quickly. This is not about the quality of Saudi weapons systems. It is about the scale, complexity, and evolution of the Houthi threat. Riyadh should not be expected to confront that challenge alone. I hope the Saudis prove me wrong. But hope is not a strategy, and neither Washington nor Saudi Arabia should build its policy around the assumption that Riyadh can handle the Houthis by itself. #iranwar
The Houthis Are Changing the Rules of the Game and Washington and Riyadh will Need a New Strategy It is time to acknowledge an uncomfortable reality: Saudi Arabia was not prepared for this confrontation with the Houthis. For years, Riyadh’s approach was essentially containment. The Saudis sought to buy stability, support arrangements that would allow the Houthi government in Sanaa to function, and gradually move toward a political roadmap that would prevent another major war. But the #Houthis drew a very different lesson from recent events. They increasingly concluded that Saudi Arabia was more vulnerable, more risk-averse, and less willing to return to a full-scale war. Instead of reinforcing deterrence, Saudi restraint appears to have strengthened the Houthis’ confidence that escalation could produce additional gains. This matters for Washington because there is a temptation to believe that the problem can be solved through Tehran: pressure Iran hard enough, and Iran will force the Houthis to stand down. That misunderstands the relationship. Iran considers the Houthis one of its most important strategic partners in the region. Tehran has provided weapons, technology, expertise and other forms of assistance that have dramatically strengthened Houthi capabilities. But influence is not the same as control. The Houthis do not see themselves simply as Iranian proxies waiting for instructions from Tehran. They see themselves as partners in the so-called Axis of Resistance, with their own interests, ideology and decision-making process. Previous confrontations with the United States demonstrated the limits of Tehran’s ability, or willingness, to restrain them. That leaves Washington with an increasingly difficult problem. The United States has already fought a military campaign against the Houthis at considerable cost and with limited strategic results. There is little reason to believe that another round of strikes, by itself, will fundamentally change Houthi behavior. A renewed campaign would consume additional munitions and military resources while again exposing American assets, particularly at sea, to attack. Washington can and should provide intelligence, defensive and military assistance to Saudi Arabia and its partners. But it cannot compensate indefinitely for the weakness and fragmentation of the anti-Houthi camp inside Yemen. Meanwhile, the Houthis are pursuing something far more consequential than another battlefield victory. Their advance toward Bab el-Mandeb potentially strengthens their ability to threaten one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. That is the real strategic issue. The Houthis do not need to defeat the United States Navy or conquer Saudi Arabia. They only need to demonstrate that they can repeatedly threaten commercial shipping, impose economic costs and force Washington and its regional partners to choose between accepting a new reality and entering another costly military confrontation. None of this means that the Houthis are invincible. They have vulnerabilities. Their military infrastructure can be attacked, their capabilities degraded and significant costs imposed on them. But destroying launchers is not the same as establishing deterrence. The central challenge is how to deter a highly ideological movement that is willing to absorb substantial punishment and possesses increasingly sophisticated missiles, drones and other capabilities developed with Iranian assistance. Saudi Arabia has already learned another important lesson: money may buy temporary calm, but it cannot buy strategic deterrence. The response therefore cannot remain a Saudi problem with occasional American military support. Protecting Bab el-Mandeb and freedom of navigation requires a broader and sustained international coalition combining maritime security, intelligence, military pressure, strengthening local partners and diplomacy. This will not be a quick campaign. And Iran is already benefiting. Tehran does not need to control every Houthi decision. From Iran’s perspective, a powerful Houthi movement capable of threatening Bab el-Mandeb, tying down Saudi Arabia, consuming American military resources and raising the economic costs of regional confrontation is itself a major strategic achievement. The main question is how to prevent the Houthis from permanently changing the strategic reality around Bab el-Mandeb. Because once they can force the United States and its partners to choose between costly escalation and accepting potential restrictions on freedom of navigation, they do not need to defeat America militarily. They have already achieved something far more valuable: changing the rules of the game. The Houthi advance and the attacks on Saudi Arabia are also exposing the so-called “Mecca Alliance” between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan to its first real strategic test — and so far, the results are hardly impressive. An alliance ultimately matters not because of the declarations made when it is established, but because of what its members are prepared to do when one of them comes under attack. Riyadh now faces a direct and growing Houthi threat, yet neither Ankara nor Islamabad appears eager to become meaningfully involved in confronting it. This raises an uncomfortable question: Is the Mecca Alliance an emerging regional security architecture, or is it becoming a paper tiger precisely when Saudi Arabia needs it most? The Houthis are providing the first serious stress test. If Turkey and Pakistan are unwilling to provide meaningful assistance when Saudi territory and strategic interests are under attack, Riyadh will have to reconsider what this alliance actually provides beyond political symbolism. For Washington, this matters as well. The United States has increasingly encouraged regional partners to assume greater responsibility for their own security. But the current crisis demonstrates the gap between announcing new regional security frameworks and actually creating alliances whose members are willing to share risks when deterrence fails. An alliance that works only in peacetime is not much of an alliance. #IranWar #yemen
The truth must be said: the latest developments in Yemen expose not only the strength of the Houthi challenge, but also the depth of the strategic failure in confronting it. A. Saudi Arabia entered this campaign unprepared. Riyadh was surprised by the Houthis’ willingness to effectively violate the road map and continue the campaign until the siege imposed on them is lifted. The Saudi assumption that it would be possible to preserve calm over the long term through economic and political arrangements proved wrong. B. Saudi Arabia’s policy of containment has run its course. Until the outbreak of the current crisis, the Saudi approach was based largely on containing the Houthis, including transferring funds intended to help finance the Houthi government’s expenditures. But the war against Iran strengthened in Sanaa the perception that Saudi Arabia was weaker and more vulnerable than previously believed. That perception has played a significant part in what we are seeing today. C. Sending messages to Tehran will not solve the problem. Iran views the Houthis as a strategic asset of the highest order, but its ability to control their decision-making process is limited. We have already seen how the Houthis entered into confrontation with the United States despite the threats conveyed from Washington to Tehran. The Houthis do not see themselves as Iranian proxies waiting for instructions. In their view, they are partners in the axis, and they themselves make the decisions concerning war and peace. D. There is considerable doubt that Washington wants to return to a direct campaign against the Houthis. The United States has already waged a campaign against them that produced limited gains, and it is difficult to assume that it is eager to enter another confrontation that would require the allocation of additional forces and resources and expose American assets to attack, especially at sea. Washington can provide Saudi Arabia with significant intelligence and military assistance, but here too a problem is exposed: the forces backed by Riyadh were not prepared for the current campaign. For a long period, Saudi Arabia was more occupied with removing the Emirati presence from southern Yemen than with preparing its camp for a renewed confrontation with the Houthis. E. In the meantime, the Houthis are achieving strategic gains. Their advance toward Bab el-Mandeb strengthens their ability to threaten one of the world’s most important shipping routes. At the same time, the “Makkah alliance” is still debating how to respond. And even if it decides to intervene more significantly, it is far from clear that this will be enough to change the Houthi pattern of action. F. Therefore, the strategy toward the Houthis must change. This confrontation cannot be left on Saudi Arabia’s shoulders alone. It may be a long, costly and complex process, but there is a need to build a significant international coalition that will confront the Houthi threat over time. This is a threat that is not expected to disappear anytime soon—if at all. G. The Houthis are not all-powerful. They have vulnerabilities, and they can be hit. The problem is that it is very difficult to build a stable deterrence equation against them. Their ideology, their willingness to absorb a cost, and their ability to use strategic weapons that Iran supplied to them or helped them produce make it very difficult to create classic deterrence. And what the Saudi experience has already proved is that money cannot buy a strategic solution to this problem. Bottom line: it is becoming increasingly clear that this represents a significant achievement for the resistance axis. The United States and the countries of the “Makkah alliance” now face a difficult dilemma, because a return to the previous status quo appears less and less possible. From Iran’s perspective, this is a clear strategic achievement: it may not control the Houthis’ decisions, but it certainly benefits from their ability to threaten freedom of navigation at Bab el-Mandeb and exert pressure on the United States, Saudi Arabia and the international system as a whole.
Translated from HebrewPresident Joseph Aoun may prove to be a figure of historic importance for Israel, in a position reminiscent of Anwar Sadat: a leader who comes after a difficult and bloody confrontation with Israel, but who may envision a completely different future for relations with it. Aoun would not have reached his current position without the dramatic weakening of Hezbollah at Israel’s hands. Hezbollah wanted to see Suleiman Frangieh in the presidential palace, and not by chance. Hassan Nasrallah knew very well who Joseph Aoun was and what his election could mean for the balance of power inside Lebanon. But this is exactly where Israel’s dilemma begins: Israel could create the conditions for political change in Lebanon through military force, but it will not be able to complete this change through military force alone. As long as Israel remains in Lebanese territory and continues its attacks, it makes it harder for Aoun and the Lebanese government to prove to the Lebanese public that achievements against Israel can be attained through the state and diplomacy. At the same time, it gives Hezbollah its most important argument: that only “the resistance” is capable of forcing the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon. Israel cannot both turn a military presence in Lebanon into a permanent policy and dream of a peace agreement with the Lebanese state. Therefore Israel must decide how it sees the future of its relations with Lebanon. Is the goal a war of attrition and a prolonged military presence, or an attempt to exploit the rare window of opportunity that has emerged to build a different reality? The second option is not without risks. It will require an Israeli withdrawal from most of the Lebanese territory as part of a diplomatic move, closer ties with the Lebanese government and a long-term plan, together with the United States, Saudi Arabia and France, to strengthen the Lebanese army and the state’s ability to expand its sovereignty. The potential gain is clear, as is the risk. But continuing the current policy also has a cost. If Israel continues to rely on weapons without diplomacy, it is only a matter of time before Hezbollah tries to rebuild a model of guerrilla warfare against the Israeli presence. One of Israel’s greatest achievements in the campaign against the Iranian axis is not only the military damage inflicted on Hezbollah, but the change in Lebanon’s political reality. If Israel does not know how to translate this military achievement into a diplomatic move, it may see it erode and find itself sinking into the Lebanese mire once again. We are not in 2000. This is not the same unilateral withdrawal in the face of Hezbollah at the height of its power. Hezbollah is significantly weaker, and above all, Lebanon now has a president and prime minister who may be prepared to cross the Rubicon in relations with Israel. The question is whether Israel is prepared to cross it with them. Military victory created the opportunity. But only diplomacy can turn it into a new strategic reality.
Translated from HebrewThe depth of the U.S. commitment to Jordan’s security means Washington has little choice but to make every effort to intercept Iranian missiles threatening Jordanian territory, even at a significant cost in interceptors. That helps explain the scale of the defensive response to the latest Iranian barrage. But the broader strategic picture is increasingly troubling: both Washington and Tehran are failing to deter each other. Each side appears to believe that raising the military cost will eventually force the other to back down. Instead, the opposite is happening. Every escalation is answered not by restraint or capitulation, but by another escalation. This is the fundamental problem with the current trajectory. There is no obvious kinetic path back to a stable status quo. If the United States intensifies attacks on Iranian tankers, Tehran is more likely to expand its attacks on tankers in the Gulf, not reduce them. And additional Iranian attacks will, in turn, increase the pressure on Washington to respond. Iran is not deterring the United States, and the United States is not deterring Iran. Meanwhile, another race is underway: between the deterioration of Iran’s economy and the rising global price of oil. So far, neither side appears to believe that this economic pressure is sufficient reason to reduce its willingness to use force. The critical question, therefore, is whether someone will find a way to interrupt this dangerous escalation cycle and bring the parties back toward diplomacy or whether both sides will continue climbing the ladder until escalation becomes increasingly difficult to control. Seen in this context, last night’s events were not the end of an escalation cycle. They were another step toward the next one. #IranWar #iran
Initial assessment of the Iranian response: 1. Iran is escalating and nothing about that should be surprising. Tehran has repeatedly signaled that it will respond to growing U.S. pressure by moving up the escalation ladder, not by backing down. 2. The scale and coordination of the missile launches matter. Firing this number of missiles from multiple locations suggests that Iran has been rebuilding its operational capabilities. It also likely reflects growing confidence in the size of its remaining missile inventory and its ability to sustain additional rounds of attacks. 3. Iran appears to be aiming for more than signaling. Tehran likely calculates that a sufficiently large and complex salvo, potentially including cluster-warhead missiles, could overwhelm or penetrate U.S. and allied air defenses in Jordan. In other words, the objective is not simply to demonstrate capability; it is to inflict damage. 4. There is no reason to assume this round is over. Given previous IRGC threats, Iran could expand its response beyond missile attacks, including attempts to strike tankers while they are anchored in Gulf ports. 5. Iran’s strategic objective is increasingly clear: impose a much higher price for the U.S. “tanker-for-tanker” strategy and demonstrate that military pressure will not restore deterrence. This explains the steady movement upward on Iran’s escalation ladder. 6. The speed of Iranian decision-making is also significant. Tehran appears to have prepared a "menu" of retaliatory options in advance, allowing it to respond quickly rather than starting a new decision-making process after every U.S. action. 7. This creates a fundamental problem for Washington. It will be extremely difficult to identify the point at which additional U.S. military action suddenly restores deterrence. If Washington escalates, Tehran is likely to escalate again. Pressure is producing escalation, not capitulation. 8. The current status quo is therefore inherently unstable. Iran will not simply accept an indefinite maritime blockade, nor will it allow Washington to impose mounting economic costs without imposing costs of its own. The key question for Washington is no longer whether Iran will respond to additional pressure, but how far both sides are prepared to climb an escalation ladder that neither appears capable of controlling. #iran
Another rung on the escalation ladder. There is no kinetic solution to the Strait of Hormuz problem. Every attempt to impose one only brings Washington and Tehran closer to an escalation that may become increasingly difficult to control. A “tanker for tanker” dynamic will not compel Iran to back down. It will almost certainly trigger further Iranian retaliation, eventually forcing President Trump to make a difficult choice: escalate significantly or find an off-ramp. The fundamental problem is that the current status quo is inherently unstable. The assumption that economic pressure can continue indefinitely while allowing the United States to avoid a wider military confrontation is simply not supported by what we are seeing on the ground. Iran will respond to sustained pressure, and each additional round of retaliation and counter-retaliation increases the risk to global energy markets. Oil prices will rise even if the United States continues to strike or sink Iranian tankers. Military action may impose costs on Tehran. It does not solve the Hormuz problem. Without a credible diplomatic off-ramp, it risks turning coercion into an escalation cycle with no clear end state. #iran
I reiterate a fundamental point: Saudi Arabia is not fighting a battle today that concerns it alone; in Yemen, it is confronting an Iranian-backed Houthi threat that affects the security of the region and the entire international community. What is happening concerns more than the security of Saudi Arabia’s borders. The Houthis’ continued ability to threaten shipping, trade routes, and energy, and to turn Yemen into an Iranian military platform, represents a direct challenge to regional and international stability. Therefore, Riyadh should not be left alone in this confrontation. Its partners in the region and beyond must stand by it and provide the support it needs to confront this threat and restore deterrence. The last thing the region needs is for the Houthis to emerge from this confrontation believing that escalation and the use of force have brought them gains. Such an outcome would not be only a Saudi problem; it would strengthen the Houthis, serve Iran’s regional strategy, and increase the likelihood of new rounds of escalation in the future. This matter is not limited to any one country or party. Responsibility falls on all the Gulf states, the United States, the European countries, and Israel as well. If Saudi Arabia is bearing the greatest burden today in confronting the Houthis, it should not be left to fight this battle alone. The Houthi threat to shipping, trade, energy, and regional stability extends beyond the Kingdom’s borders, and the results of this confrontation will affect the region and the entire international community. Therefore, it is in all these parties’ interest to support Saudi Arabia and prevent the Houthis from emerging from this confrontation feeling that escalation and force have enabled them to impose their will. This is not only a Saudi battle, but a regional and international challenge requiring a collective position. #اليمن
Translated from ArabicThe bigger question after last night is whether we will finally see any meaningful movement from the Mecca Alliance, or whether it will prove to be little more than an agreement on paper. The Saudi logic behind building this framework was clear: Riyadh did not want to confront the Houthis alone. It sought a broader network of partnerships that could strengthen Saudi deterrence and provide political and potentially military support in a conflict the Houthis have increasingly forced upon the Kingdom. But the latest escalation is exposing the limits of that concept. What is becoming increasingly clear is that this is not a collective-defense alliance in any meaningful sense. The reluctance of Saudi Arabia’s partners to respond, presumably out of concern that they could be dragged into an unwanted confrontation, highlights the gap between signing security agreements and actually accepting risk on behalf of an ally. That matters far beyond Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has spent considerable political capital trying to build a regional security architecture that reduces its vulnerability and strengthens deterrence. A security framework that remains passive when Saudi territory comes under attack inevitably raises questions about its credibility. There is also a broader international dimension. Saudi Arabia and its partners are not simply fighting for Saudi interests. They are confronting an Iranian-Houthi strategy that threatens freedom of navigation through critical maritime chokepoints and gives Tehran and the Houthis significant leverage over international commerce and energy markets. For precisely that reason, one might have expected much more substantial international and regional support for Riyadh. Last night was therefore more than another episode in the Saudi-Houthi confrontation. It was a test of whether the new regional security architecture surrounding Saudi Arabia can translate political commitments into action when it actually matters. So far, the answer is far from reassuring. #IranWar #yemen
Dear Jamal, there is a striking similarity between the American-Iranian confrontation and the escalating confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. The #Houthi attack on Saudi Arabia last night came amid a major escalation in Saudi operations against the group, and after a series of important battlefield successes. The logic here closely resembles what we saw in the confrontation between Iran and the United States: the more pressure was brought to bear on Tehran, including the naval blockade, the less Iran retreated; instead, it escalated its response and went so far as to launch missiles toward an American aircraft carrier. The main conclusion is that increasing pressure on Iran or the Houthis does not necessarily mean pushing them into retreat. On the contrary, it is likely to lead to a counter-escalation. Riyadh and Washington therefore find themselves facing a similar dilemma: either reduce the level of escalation and try to find a political way out, or expand military operations with the aim of weakening the adversary more fundamentally. The second option may achieve important military gains, but it also carries a heavy price, and there is no guarantee of achieving a decisive victory. At the same time, every passing day seems to strengthen the argument Abu Dhabi has adopted for years regarding the Houthis: economic incentives alone cannot be relied upon to change the strategic behavior of an armed group with a long-term political and military project. Saudi Arabia is not fighting a battle today that concerns only its own security. The results of this confrontation will directly affect the security of the Red Sea, freedom of international navigation, and the ability of Iran and the Houthis to threaten one of the world's most important sea lanes. Therefore, there is a genuine regional and international interest in helping #الرياض weaken the military capabilities that allow the Houthis to threaten navigation. But there is no military option without a price. Continuing the escalation also means an increased risk of attacks on Saudi energy facilities, higher oil prices, and an expansion of the regional confrontation. Therefore, if Saudi Arabia and its allies decide to continue this campaign, it is essential that Riyadh receive genuine international support, that the campaign's objectives be clear and realistic, and that it be prepared at the same time for the repercussions of escalation. What is happening is no longer merely another round of the Saudi-Houthi conflict. It is a battle whose results could help determine the future of security in Bab el-Mandeb, and who has the ability to threaten or protect freedom of navigation in this strategic passage.
Translated from ArabicThere is a striking parallel between the U.S.-Iran confrontation and the escalating Saudi-Houthi conflict. Last night’s vicious #houthi attack on Saudi Arabia came amid a dramatic intensification of Saudi operations against the group and a series of significant battlefield gains. The logic is similar to what we have seen from Tehran: as U.S. pressure intensified, including the maritime blockade, Iran escalated rather than backed down, eventually crossing another threshold by launching missiles toward a U.S. aircraft carrier. The broader lesson is important: greater pressure on Iran and the Houthis should not be expected to produce capitulation. It is more likely to produce escalation. That leaves Washington and Riyadh facing a similar strategic dilemma. They can reduce tensions and search for a diplomatic off-ramp, or they can expand military operations in an effort to fundamentally weaken their adversaries. The latter may produce significant operational gains, but it will also carry substantial costs, with no guarantee of decisive victory. At the same time, each passing day strengthens the argument that Abu Dhabi’s more assertive approach toward the Houthis had merit. Years of incentives, economic inducements, and attempts to manage the threat did not fundamentally change the Houthis’ behavior or strategic ambitions. Saudi Arabia is now fighting a campaign whose consequences extend far beyond its own security. The outcome will affect freedom of navigation through one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints and the ability of both Iran and the Houthis to threaten international shipping. Riyadh therefore deserves meaningful international support in degrading Houthi capabilities. But there is no cost-free military option. Continued escalation will expose Saudi energy infrastructure to further attacks and could place additional upward pressure on global oil prices. If Riyadh and its partners intend to continue this campaign, they should do so with sustained international support, realistic objectives, and a clear understanding of the escalation risks. This is no longer simply another round in the Saudi-Houthi confrontation. It is becoming a struggle over the future security architecture of the Bab el-Mandeb—and, ultimately, over who can threaten or protect freedom of navigation through this critical waterway. #IranWar #yemen
The #Houthis have no intention of backing down. Despite Saudi pressure through Riyadh-aligned forces in Yemen, the Houthis appear to believe there is no going back to the pre-escalation status quo. Their objective is not simply to survive the current pressure campaign, but to force Saudi Arabia to relent and lift the restrictions imposed on them. That puts Riyadh back in an extremely difficult strategic position. Escalation carries significant risks and could ultimately backfire. But making concessions is hardly cost-free either: it could give the Houthis additional political and economic space to consolidate their rule, rebuild their military capabilities, and deepen their relationship with Iran. The fundamental problem is that the old status quo is probably gone. Both options available to Saudi Arabia are therefore deeply problematic. Unless Saudi-backed forces can achieve dramatic battlefield gains that genuinely threaten Houthi control of northern Yemen, it is difficult to see the Houthis retreating without extracting significant concessions from Riyadh. And even in that scenario, it remains unclear whether military pressure would force them to compromise, or simply push them toward further escalation. For Saudi Arabia, this is increasingly becoming a choice not between a good and a bad option, but between two potentially costly ones. #yemen
The trust shattered between Iran and the Gulf states will be extremely difficult to rebuild. But Gulf leaders also understand that pushing Tehran into a corner and attempting to isolate it diplomatically does not necessarily produce greater security. Their emerging approach is better understood as diversification: maintain channels with Iran while, at the same time, significantly strengthening deterrence against it. Middle Eastern statecraft is rarely binary. It is not a choice between engagement and deterrence, diplomacy and military power, or Iran and Israel. Gulf states can talk to adversaries, cooperate with partners, and strengthen their own defensive capabilities simultaneously. Anyone expecting the Gulf states to simply abandon engagement with Iran and move decisively closer to Israel after the war should take another look at Gargash’s remarks. They capture an important lesson about how Gulf capitals are thinking about the regional order. And one final point: renewed Gulf engagement with Tehran does not automatically come at Israel’s expense. Gulf states can maintain relationships with both. But a meaningful deepening of ties with Israel will depend heavily on a significant change in Israeli policy above all, on the Palestinian issue. The region is moving toward hedging and diversification, not rigid blocs. Washington and Jerusalem would be wise to recognize that reality. And on a day when Israel’s defense minister is threatening to “crush” the Palestinian Authority, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Israel is moving in precisely the opposite direction. #IranWar
My numbers in the lottery has not yet come - but they will! In both cases, this is not an assessment it is crystal-ball strategy. And no serious national security policy should be built on predictions that no one can make with confidence. Mass protests in Iran could erupt tomorrow, or they may not happen for years. Right now, the regime appears stable. And even if large-scale protests do break out, the regime has repeatedly demonstrated that it is willing to use extreme violence against its own people to survive. If Israeli strategy is ultimately based on the assumption that economic pressure will bring Iranians into the streets and that those protests will then bring down the regime, that is not a strategy. At best, it is an educated guess. Hope for regime collapse is not an exit strategy. #iran
And this is the summary of my position on this issue: A word of warning to Israel’s decision-makers regarding relations with Egypt. And if there is a warning that should truly concern us, it is directed at us: If Israel continues its current policy in the region, especially if it continues to promote the idea of pushing Palestinians from Gaza toward Sinai, we may find ourselves endangering one of the State of Israel’s most important strategic assets with our own hands. The peace treaty with Egypt was a historic breakthrough in Israel’s relations with the Arab world. Do we really want to reach a situation in which we are once again forced to build the Israeli army around a southern front and rethink the concepts of creating a southern military corps? And with which soldiers exactly? Peace is a strategic choice for both sides. But it is not something that can be considered guaranteed forever. Therefore, the Israeli goal should not be to search for signs of war in every Egyptian move, but to do everything possible to ensure that peace remains Cairo’s and Jerusalem’s strategic choice in the future as well.
Translated from ArabicI propose a completely different angle on relations with Egypt and the discourse surrounding the "truth alert": A. Despite the Swords of Iron War, President el-Sisi repeatedly declares on almost every possible stage that peace is Egypt's strategic choice. This is not a meaningless statement, certainly against the backdrop of the deep crisis in relations with Israel. B. Unlike previous crises, Egypt did not recall its ambassador and maintained, even during the most difficult periods of the war, continuity of the diplomatic channel with Israel. C. With all due respect to the rapprochement between Cairo and Ankara, Egypt did not join a Mecca alliance. Relations with Turkey have indeed strengthened significantly, but they are still accompanied by mistrust and divergent interests. We must not turn every regional rapprochement into an alliance directed against Israel. D. Egypt sees the possibility of pushing Palestinians from Gaza into its territory as a tangible threat to its national security. For Cairo this is a red line. And despite that, el-Sisi invited Netanyahu to the peace conference in Egypt. Netanyahu was the one who chose not to attend. E. The Egyptians detest Hamas and pressure it to disarm. But contrary to some of the discourse in Israel, they also understand that the ability to talk with Hamas is an asset, because without such a channel it is very difficult to influence the reality in Gaza and mediate arrangements. Even Israel spoke with Hamas... F. Today it is also clearer that an influence effort took place, intended to portray Egypt as a growing threat in the eyes of the Israeli public, including through false or exaggerated reports about what is happening in Sinai. This fact requires great caution before accepting every report about "Egyptian preparations for war." G. Egypt is indeed building up militarily, and Israel must monitor this buildup. But Egypt, like almost every major country in the Middle East, is dealing with a long list of threats and challenges unrelated to Israel: the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, instability in Sudan and Libya, the threat to shipping lanes and the consequences of the Houthis' activity, along with serious internal and economic challenges. Not every tank or aircraft Egypt purchases is intended for a future war with Israel. H. And in stark contrast to previous periods, despite the difficult war in Gaza we have seen almost no mass protests in Egypt on behalf of the Palestinians. This fact too needs to be included in the equation. All this does not mean that we should close our eyes. The Egyptian regime does not educate its public for peace with Israel, anti-normalization remains deep, and Israel certainly must closely monitor Egypt's military buildup. But the distance from here to talking about a "truth alert" regarding Egypt is great. If there is an alert here that should concern us, it is directed specifically at us: if Israel continues its current policy in the region, and especially if it continues to raise the possibility of pushing Palestinians from Gaza into Sinai, we may endanger with our own hands one of the most important strategic assets of the State of Israel. The peace treaty with Egypt was a historic breakthrough in Israel's relations with the Arab world. Do we really want to reach a situation in which we once again have to build the IDF around a southern front and think in terms of establishing a southern corps? And with exactly which soldiers? Peace is the strategic choice of both sides. It cannot be taken for granted, and therefore Israel's goal should be not to look for signs of war in every Egyptian move, but to do everything possible so that peace remains the strategic choice of Cairo and Jerusalem in the future as well.
Translated from HebrewOne thing should be clear from the latest interview with Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and one of the most powerful figures in Tehran today: Iran is preparing for escalation, not capitulation. Iran’s economic situation may be considerably worse than Rezaei is willing to acknowledge, or perhaps even fully understands. But Washington should not confuse economic pain with strategic surrender. Tehran has shown no intention of relinquishing its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Rezaei’s latest threats to establish a new “exclusion zone” only reinforce that point. This leaves the Trump administration approaching a critical decision point. Iran and Oman have been working on a framework for managing maritime traffic through the Strait, while Tehran continues to insist that reopening Hormuz must be tied to U.S. concessions, including relief from the naval blockade. If the administration accepts an Oman-Iran arrangement as the basis for renewed diplomacy, there may still be a path toward de-escalation. If it rejects such a framework and insists that economic and military pressure will eventually force Tehran to back down, another round of escalation becomes increasingly difficult to avoid. The most important warning sign is that Iran has already crossed another threshold: firing ballistic missiles toward major U.S. naval assets, including an aircraft carrier. Whatever the tactical outcome of those attacks, the strategic message matters. Tehran is demonstrating that even under severe economic pressure, it is prepared to climb the escalation ladder rather than surrender its leverage. #IranWar
One recurring feature of Iranian influence operations, and one that should especially concern us, is the shift from the digital sphere to the physical world. It usually starts online: the Iranians enter existing groups or set up new ones, often on Telegram—a platform that allows a relatively easy transition from group discussion to direct, personal communication with group members. In the next stage, they try to exploit the trust that has been built to motivate Israelis to take action in the real world. This can begin with tasks that seem relatively innocent, such as putting up flyers, and progress to far more serious actions, including gathering information and surveilling people. This trend is becoming more worrying because of two developments that work in the Iranians’ favor: their increasingly deep familiarity with Israeli society, and a significant improvement in their technological capabilities, including the use of AI, among other things to overcome the language barrier and produce more credible and natural Hebrew. It is likely that the phenomenon will only worsen as the elections approach. Iran will not hesitate to try to deepen existing rifts in Israeli society, and it can do so simultaneously from both sides of the divide. From its perspective, the goal is not necessarily to advance a particular side, but to intensify polarization, undermine trust, and exploit the divisions that already exist among us. This phenomenon has intensified since the outbreak of the Iron Swords War, and I have already written about it in the framework of @INSS.
Translated from HebrewQuoted @observer: recent attacks that exemplify Tehran’s emerging military doctrine under the rule of the late Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, and his hardline backers in the IRGC. This regime is now highly controlled by the IRGC and wants to use its capabilities. Mojtaba Khamenei is definitely more radical than his father, and so we are seeing this more aggressive behaviour. Iran’s willingness to block the strait, and its attempt to rapidly rebuild its missile and drone capabilities, as part of a broader effort to raise the cost of the war for the US and control the pace of conflict to its advantage. Tehran’s newfound willingness to go on the offensive fits within this strategy. They are not lunatics; in their minds, this is the rational thing to do in order to build deterrence… to ensure no one is willing to attack them in future. That’s why this is a doctrinal change, not just a tactical one for the coming days. @msrmichaelson https://t.co/OqquXi4Yzb
The more effective the economic pressure on Iran becomes, the greater the risk that Tehran will escalate kinetically. That is the paradox administration needs to understand. Iran’s leadership has no intention of capitulating under economic pressure. Instead, it sees its remaining military capabilities, particularly its ability to disrupt maritime traffic, as its most important source of leverage for forcing the United States to ease the naval blockade. So we should be very careful about celebrating Iran’s growing economic distress as evidence that the strategy is “working.” Economic pain does not automatically translate into political concessions. In the current Iranian calculus, the opposite may be true: the greater the economic pressure, the stronger the incentive to impose costs on the United States and the global economy. The events of the past few days should serve as a warning. If Washington increases economic pressure without providing a credible diplomatic off-ramp, it should prepare for more Iranian escalation, not Iranian capitulation. This leads to an uncomfortable question: If the administration genuinely wants to avoid being dragged back into a broader military confrontation with Iran, it needs to ask whether further intensifying economic pressure actually serves that objective. #IranWar #iran
Precisely because of statements of this kind, which are unfeasible and lack backing, I wrote the article @Haaretz There is no Israeli integration into IMEC without significant progress on the Palestinian issue. The last time I checked, Saudi Arabia was an inseparable part of this project — and Riyadh has no intention of granting Israel the strategic prize of normalization and regional integration without significant political moves toward the Palestinians. We must stop selling the Israeli public illusions. There is no genuine regional integration as long as Israel continues its current policy. It is impossible to bury one’s head in the sand regarding the Palestinian issue, ignore the political reality in the region, and at the same time expect IMEC, normalization with Saudi Arabia, and Israel’s integration into the region to simply work themselves out. The path to regional integration does not bypass the Palestinian issue. It passes through it.
Translated from HebrewIt does not matter how many threats come from CENTCOM or the White House, or how many limited military actions Washington takes: Iran will not accept a situation in which it cannot export its own oil while tankers continue moving through the Strait of Hormuz. This is the fundamental problem with the current U.S. approach. Repeated threats have had little effect on Iranian behavior. In fact, when the U.S. president warns Tehran of devastating consequences if it continues attacking tankers, or, even more seriously, U.S. forces, and those warnings are followed by either no response or only limited strikes, Tehran is likely to conclude that American deterrence is eroding, not strengthening. Washington is therefore caught in an escalation trap of its own making. It does not want a broader war with Iran, but it also feels compelled to respond when Iran attacks. Yet a major U.S. response risks triggering another round of Iranian escalation, while a limited response is unlikely to deter Tehran from continuing its attacks. That is precisely why Washington needs to reconsider its broader strategy toward Iran. Tactical military successes cannot resolve a fundamentally strategic problem. As long as Tehran believes the status quo is intolerable and Washington offers no viable diplomatic off-ramp, Iran will continue trying to change that status quo through force. Under these conditions, the next round of escalation is not a remote possibility. It is increasingly only a matter of time. #IranWar
The writing was on the wall, as were the Iranian regime’s strategic and operational objectives, which are aimed at escalation and not surrender. It was only a matter of time before Iran directed its fire toward the aircraft carriers @n12 “They can always return to attack American bases in the Gulf,” Citrinowicz says, adding that there is also the possibility of an Iranian attack on the American ships enforcing the blockade on Iran”.
Translated from HebrewListening to Hassan Rouhani today, it is hard not to think about one of the most consequential strategic costs of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA: it dramatically weakened the very forces inside Iran that were actually seeking to change the Islamic Republic’s trajectory. Rouhani was no Zionist, nor was he a pacifist. But he understood that Iran needed to change course and deepen its economic and diplomatic engagement with the West, including the United States. Much has rightly been written about the nuclear consequences of leaving the JCPOA. After the U.S. withdrawal, Iran dramatically expanded its enrichment program and moved far beyond the restrictions imposed by the agreement. But there was also a profound political consequence inside Iran that receives far less attention. In 2017, Rouhani decisively defeated Ebrahim Raisi, the candidate most closely identified with Ali Khamenei and the conservative establishment. Rouhani's argument was essentially that engagement could deliver tangible benefits for Iran. The collapse of the nuclear agreement destroyed much of the political foundation for that argument and strengthened those who had always insisted that Washington could never be trusted. Today, instead of dealing with Rouhani and those who advocated greater engagement with the West, we are dealing with figures such as Ahmad Vahidi, majid Mousavi, and Mojtaba Khamenei. Counterfactual history is always dangerous. We cannot know what Iran would look like today had the JCPOA survived. But listening to Rouhani, someone whom hardliners and elements of the IRGC increasingly treated as an adversary from within—0, it is difficult not to ask the question: What if? #iran
Connected stories
- Houthis Enter Yemen’s Strategic Red Sea Port City of Mokha
- Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan Establish Secretariat for Makkah Defense Pact
- Yemen Fighting Kills 129 as Houthis Push Toward Bab el-Mandeb
- Saudi Arabia Says Houthi Attacks on Four Cities Wounded 73 Civilians
- U.S. Strikes Two Iranian Government Tankers Under New Retaliatory Policy
- U.S. Says It Struck Three Iranian Tankers After Missile Attacks on Warships
- Iran’s Guards Say They Struck Six Vessels After U.S. Tanker Attacks
- Jordan Says It Intercepted 18 of 20 Ballistic Missiles Fired From Iran
- Iran’s Guards Say Missile-and-Drone Response to New U.S. Strikes Has Begun
- Kuwait Says Air Defenses Engaged Renewed Iranian Missile and Drone Attacks
- Iranian Media Say Four U.S. Missiles Hit Tanker Near Kharg Island
- Yemen Clashes Pass 300 Dead as Hundreds of Families Flee